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Abstract 
We study the effect of social capital in an environment in which formal, 
marketed insurance contracts coexist with informal agreements. We show 
that in the absence of peer monitoring and social pressure, non-marketed 
contracts crowd out formal ones due to moral hazard. We prove, by means of 
an equilibrium concept typical of the network literature, that social capital 
can reduce moral hazard in informal agreements. We then show that under 
certain conditions, social capital increases the demand for marketed 
insurance contracts. The theoretical model we outline provides us clear 
guidance to measure social capital in a provincial-level data set. The 
empirical model, which is estimated controlling for panel and spatial 
structure, supports our claim that social capital increases the demand for 
non-life insurance. 
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I. Introduction 
The research question we want to investigate is whether social capital 
influences individual choices about insurance expenditure. In particular, we 
are interested in demand for non-life insurance contracts. While life 
insurance can be assimilated into pension funds and other financial assets in 
terms of economic rationale – it is an investment that gives a return in the 
future – non-life insurance is different. Households buy a non-life insurance 
contract to avoid the risk of suffering losses in some states of the world: they 
pay a fixed price (the premium) to transfer money from one future uncertain 
state of the world to another. 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) set up a model in which, as well as market 
insurance, individuals could enter non-market mutual insurance agreements. 
In their model, the role played by non-market insurance was related to peer 
monitoring: if informational asymmetry between the insurer and the 
customer held in non-market contracts, they would be dysfunctional and 
non-market insurance would displace market contracts, reducing social 
welfare. Vice versa, if individuals could observe the efforts of others, non-
market contracts would be welfare enhancing since they provided extra 
insurance coverage at the market price set by the insurance company. What 
the authors call peer monitoring is the severity of moral hazard in non-
market agreements. 
We will investigate the relationship between moral hazard involved in 
non-market insurance contracts and the demand for market insurance. We 
will also formally link moral hazard and social capital, concluding that the 
latter increases the aggregate demand for insurance. Social capital is not a 
precise economic concept but covers many different but related research 
fields. A careful and theory-consistent definition of it allows us to test our 
conclusions empirically on Italian data. 
The choice of Italy as a data source is quite common in the social capital 
literature: the seminal book by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) about 
democracy and institutions’ efficiency is a source of overwhelming evidence 
on the relevance of social capital in Italian social life. Focusing on 
economics, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) found that social capital 
influences the asset-allocation choices of Italian households: they started 
from the idea that any financial contract involves trust, which is strongly 
correlated to social capital, and found empirical evidence supporting this 
relation. Moreover, Millo and Lenzi (2005) found that the Italian insurance 
market exhibits a large unexplained spatial heterogeneity and spatial 
correlation at the provincial level, even after controlling for a number of 
demographics. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) pointed out that a possible 
role for social capital in economic models is to limit market inefficiencies 
when institutions fail to resolve them: in Italy, family ties are frequently 
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substitutes for inefficient institutions. Religious communities as well as 
some other professional and voluntary associations play a role in 
supplementing part of the social welfare not provided by the state; disabled 
and elderly people’s assistance or scholarships are some examples. We 
therefore claim that social capital can explain a substantial part of the 
heterogeneity in insurance demand.  
We estimate our model on a panel database of Italian provinces, 
explicitly taking spatial correlation into account. Spatial panel estimation 
techniques, first outlined in Anselin (1988), have not become a standard in 
the insurance literature because of computational difficulties. Based on the 
comprehensive treatment of Elhorst (2003), we develop new procedures in 
the R language for maximum likelihood estimation of spatial autoregressive 
and spatial error panel models.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
economic model and provides a formal definition of social capital. Section 
III describes the data at hand, while Section IV is dedicated to the definition 
of an empirical measure for social capital. Section V describes the estimation 
procedure and results, and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.  
II. The model 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) were interested in the general equilibrium and 
welfare effects of non-market insurance and peer monitoring. Their model 
provides the background to study the effects of moral hazard and social 
capital on the demand for market insurance. In this section, we describe the 
main results and intuitions of the model, while a formal derivation of the 
required results can be found in Appendix A. 
The starting point is the canonical moral hazard model without non-
market insurance. There is a single and fixed-damage accident, and the 
probability of its occurrence, p(e), is strictly convex and decreasing in the 
individual’s effort at accident avoidance, e, which is not observable to the 
insurer. At the competitive, constrained equilibrium, the insurer offers less 
than full insurance to induce its clients to augment their effort at accident 
avoidance. This equilibrium is stable only if clients purchase no additional 
insurance. This exclusivity condition is similar to what happens in the real 
world: insurance companies cannot force their clients to buy just one 
contract, but they ask them what other contracts they have covering the same 
risk and, in the case of accident occurrence, payout is divided proportionally 
among insurers.  
Non-market insurance is introduced as follows: a couple of symmetric 
individuals, i and j, agree that if only one of them has an accident, the other 
will transfer δ to the former. If moral hazard affects the non-market 
agreement – i.e. if each individual does not observe the other’s effort and 
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there are no incentives to cooperate – the exclusivity provision cannot be 
enforced. It is optimal for clients to reduce their effort, while the insurance 
company is still offering the same contract. This is a partial equilibrium 
result since it does not consider the reaction of insurance companies to 
agents’ behaviour. In a general equilibrium context, the company knows that 
the required level of effort for the offered contract cannot be enforced: non-
market insurance crowds out market insurance and individuals substitute 
insurance provided by a risk-neutral insurer with that provided by a risk-
averse one. Expected utility is then lower than without non-market 
insurance. Moral hazard does not play a role if the insured perfectly observe 
each other’s efforts or if there are incentives to cooperate. Arnott and Stiglitz 
(1991) show that, in this event, each client provides non-market insurance up 
to full coverage in order to augment the risk-sharing opportunity.  
Compared with Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), we need a further step: while 
they were interested in the welfare effects of non-market agreements, we 
want to investigate how demand for insurance changes if non-market 
agreements are available. In order to achieve this, we restrict the shape of 
individual utility functions and of contracts offered by insurance companies 
in order to have clear empirical implications, at the price of a set of 
assumptions common to the applied literature on insurance.  
The first assumption is that insurance companies can offer only linear 
contracts, i.e. q(α, β) = β/α, where q is the contract’s price, β is the premium 
paid by the client and α is the net payout received if the accident occurs. 
Second, market insurance contracts are exclusive, meaning that agents can 
sign just one contract with one insurance firm to cover a given risk. Third, 
the insurance market is competitive and companies set the price in order to 
make zero profit. Therefore, at equilibrium, q = β/α = p(e)/{1–p(e)}.  
Drawing from the analytical treatment of moral hazard models in Arnott 
and Stiglitz (1988), under a set of assumptions about the utility function 
detailed in Appendix A, we can characterise the demand functions: first, 
demand for insurance decreases with the price of insurance and effort 
increases with price; second, if there exists an equilibrium without non-
market agreements 0 { 0}E e q δ: , , =%% %  and one with non-market agreements 
and no moral hazard 1 { 0}E e q δ∗ ∗ ∗: , , > , demand for market insurance is 
higher in E1 than in E0.1  
One important feature of the model is that market insurance and non-
market agreements can coexist only if the latter are not affected by moral 
hazard. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) distinguish between the cases in which 
 
1Note that we obtained a testable implication about insurance demand but not an existence result: while 
it is possible to prove that an equilibrium with linear pricing always exists (see Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) 
for details), it may entail corner solutions, i.e. zero insurance or positive profits. The additional 
assumptions we make rule out corner solutions; therefore E1 may not exist. 
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effort is observable by peers (no moral hazard) and those in which it is not. 
We claim that peer monitoring is not the only way to avoid moral hazard. 
This is a natural assumption within a couple or a family, but not among 
people with looser ties, such as members of a religious community or people 
living in a small, isolated village. In a broader setting, the level of trust 
between individuals entering the informal agreement, the severity of 
punishment for deviating, the power of reputation and social pressure can 
induce cooperative behaviour even without perfect peer observability. In a 
nutshell, social capital can reduce moral hazard in non-market agreements.  
Social capital is an elusive concept which has particular meanings 
depending on the context in which it is used, but in order to have a testable 
model we need to formalise this concept. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) 
pointed out that a common feature of definitions of social capital is the focus 
on interpersonal relationships and social networks. This is the reason why 
we use a network approach proposed by Vega-Redondo (2006).  
Suppose that pairs of individuals entering a non-market insurance 
agreement can choose in each period whether to put in effort eMH, the one 
with moral hazard in the Arnott–Stiglitz framework, or e*, effort without 
moral hazard. Once this game is put in a dynamic setting, we have a finite 
population of agents where each pair of interacting agents (i, j) is involved in 
an infinite repetition of a prisoner’s dilemma game. For any agent i, the 
strategy is of the following type: 
1. Player i chooses whether to start her interaction with j putting in effort e* 
(which is to cooperate) or to put in effort eMH.  
2. In following rounds, she reacts immediately to the news that j did not 
start with e* with some other agent in j’s network by switching 
irreversibly to eMH in her game with j.  
Under this setting, we prove that there exists a pairwise-stable network 
(PSN), i.e. a network where, for every separate link, both players have 
incentives to sustain the cooperative equilibrium. Given a characterisation of 
the expected utility of players, Vega-Redondo (2006) showed that a PSN is 
more likely to be achieved in networks characterised by a large stock of 
social capital, which is defined as the average number of links per agent. 
The first part of the model, derived from Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), 
shows that if non-market insurance agreements do not involve moral hazard, 
their presence positively affects demand for market insurance. We then 
invoke Vega-Redondo (2006) to prove that moral hazard is inversely related 
to network stability. Since the likelihood of achieving a pairwise-stable 
network is increasing in the stock of social capital, we conclude that social 
capital positively affects the demand for market insurance. 
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III. Demographics and insurance data 
We consider the total of all non-life insurance classes, excluding only 
mandatory motor third-party liability (TPL) because of its compulsory 
nature. In order to measure the effect of social capital on insurance 
purchases, we have to control for the determinants of insurance 
development. Theoretical models of non-life insurance demand, starting 
from the seminal paper of Mossin (1968), predict that, for a given level of 
risk exposure, insurance demand is increasing with risk aversion, probability 
of loss and wealth at stake. Empirical studies identify some observable 
counterparts. Wealth, when not observable, is generally proxied by means of 
income or bank deposits; so is risk exposure, which is in turn related to total 
wealth and the level of economic activity. Loss probability may too be 
related to income as a measure of economic activity; urbanisation has also 
been suggested for this purpose (Browne, Chung and Frees, 2000). The loss 
ratio – i.e. the ratio between claims paid by the insurer and premiums 
collected – has also been suggested as a proxy for the probability of loss 
(Browne, Chung and Frees, 2000). Aspects of risk aversion may be captured 
by education or the age structure of the population, even though the expected 
sign of the effect is unclear.2 
1. Controlling for supply-side variables 
We stated in Section II that an insurance company has limited discriminating 
power, i.e. if individuals are heterogeneous, it can offer different contracts 
(which means different prices) based on observable characteristics of 
individuals in a particular subpopulation but it cannot offer individual 
contracts based on effort, which is always unobserved by the insurer. This 
means that in an empirical investigation on demand for insurance, it is 
crucial to control for supply-side changes (i.e. for offered prices), in order to 
be sure that the marginal effects of interest (which we investigate based on 
the demand equation) are not completely absorbed by equilibrium prices. 
This is not a trivial problem: as Schlesinger (2000) notes, 
it is often difficult to determine what is meant by the price and the quantity of 
insurance. ... the fundamental two building blocks of economic theory have no direct 
counterparts for insurance. 
In practice, we can observe only insurance consumption, the product 
between equilibrium price and quantity, jointly determined by the interplay 
of supply and demand. The choice of a price variable, when available, is 
therefore far from obvious. We do not observe the amounts insured; 
 
2See Grace and Skipper (1991), Browne and Kim (1993) and the discussion in Browne, Chung and 
Frees (2000). 
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therefore mean premium rates – which would probably be best – are ruled 
out. We resort therefore to the loss ratio, as, for example, in Esho et al. 
(2004), observing that the role of this index as a proxy for market riskiness 
could lead to ambiguity. Due to unavailability of data on losses for the non-
life market, we include the aggregate loss ratio for the property sector only 
(fire, motor non-third-party liability, other material loss). 
Lastly, given the importance of tied agents in the distribution of insurance 
products (this channel accounted in 2000 for 88.3 per cent of non-life 
premium volume3), the log of agencies per capita has been included as a 
supply-side driver, inversely related to the opportunity cost of searching for 
insurance cover.  
Our data set consists of an excerpt for the years 1998–2000 from the Geo-
Starter database. We chose these three years of data in order to have 
homogeneous definitions of provinces (provinces’ boundaries changed in 
1996 and, to a lesser extent, in 2001) and a large set of controls, which are 
not all available in each yearly release of the database. Geo-Starter provides 
both first-hand data and an organised collection of variables from various 
institutional sources. Disposable income, value added by branch, exports, 
unemployment, family size, population density, land shape and surface and 
the age structure of the population are collected at the provincial level from 
Istituto Tagliacarne, the regional statistics branch of the Italian statistical 
service Istat. The data on bank deposits are collected by the Bank of Italy. 
Data on insurance premiums are collected on a provincial basis by ISVAP, 
the Italian insurance authority, aggregated into three categories: life, 
compulsory third-party liability (the vast majority of which involves motor 
vehicles) and other non-life. While motor third-party liability is a 
homogeneous class, both life and other non-life comprise very different 
kinds of policies. Different classes of non-life insurance cover different 
protection needs, but unfortunately complete data for subsectors of non-life 
are not available at this territorial disaggregation level. Nevertheless, the 
economic rationale behind the purchase of insurance coverage is similar and 
thus it is appropriate to consider non-life (or property-liability) insurance as 
a whole, as done also in most of the empirical literature.4  
2. Measuring insurance consumption 
As noted above, we can observe the equilibrium value of insurance 
consumption but neither the quantity nor the price of insurance. 
Furthermore, measuring insurance consumption across administrative 
regions of different economic and demographic size requires some sort of 
 
3Including motor third-party liability. Source: Italian Insurers’ Association (ANIA). 
4See, for example, Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria (1988), Outreville (1990), Browne, Chung and 
Frees (2000), Enz (2000) and Esho et al. (2004). 
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rescaling. Two common normalised measures are used in the literature as 
well as among practitioners: insurance penetration, defined as how much 
insurance premiums contribute to GDP, which accounts for the relative 
importance of the insurance sector; and insurance density, defined as 
premiums per capita, which measures average per-capita expenditure. In 
accordance with most relevant papers in the empirical literature on insurance 
development,5 we focus on insurance density.6 In the same fashion, all 
variables subject to a size bias in the information set have been normalised 
with respect to the relevant benchmark.  
3. Locational issues 
Premium data are registered according to the location of the sales point 
provided by companies. Our observations are for the Italian administrative 
units called provincie, corresponding to level 3 in the NUTS (Nomenclature 
of Territorial Units for Statistics) classification by Eurostat. When we refer 
to macro-regions, we divide the 20 NUTS2 Italian regioni into five 
aggregates – North-West, North-East, Centre, South and Islands – according 
to Istat, the Italian statistics bureau. Besides the unavoidable aggregation 
bias due to the arbitrariness of administrative boundaries with respect to the 
geographic dimension of economic phenomena,7 some important additional 
biases may arise if the location of the sales point differs from the actual 
location of the insured.  
First, for most big contracts negotiated by brokers and also for some 
distribution agreements (for example, in bancassurance), big units usually 
located at important industrial or financial centres are accountable for all 
business nationwide. This is the case for marine insurance premiums 
collected by business units located in the main ports for customers doing 
business elsewhere, and for some nationwide salesperson networks whose 
business goes through a single agency typically located at the company 
headquarters.  
Second, collective policies purchased by firms as mandatory cover or as a 
fringe benefit for their employees, most typically in the accident, health and 
life classes, are bound to one sales point location even if they are actually 
insuring risks spread over a wider territory.  
 
5Specifically, Beenstock, Dickinson and Khajuria (1988), Outreville (1990), Browne, Chung and Frees 
(2000) and Esho et al. (2004). 
6The density measure is selected for convenience in the specification, in order to avoid having GDP at 
the denominator of the regressand and then also as a right-hand-side variable. 
7See Anselin (1988). 
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IV. How to measure social capital 
In Section II, we tackled one of the major problems pointed out by Durlauf 
and Fafchamps (2004), which is to give a sound economic meaning to social 
capital. Now we have to address a second controversial issue: a reasonable 
empirical measure of this concept. Since we have province-level data, our 
definition suggests a somewhat natural way to measure social capital: we 
want to measure the density and cohesiveness of social networks 
characterising each province. We are not the first to propose such a measure: 
Goldin and Katz (1999) based their empirical measure of social capital 
intensity on Coleman’s (1988) definition of closure, which is the same 
concept as network cohesiveness in Vega-Redondo (2006). They had a data 
set on schooling and some economic variables on Iowa in the US in 1915. 
The detail was at the level of counties, comparable to Italian provinces. 
Goldin and Katz’s measure was the proportion of the county population 
living in small towns. Their claim was that 
Small town in America was a locus of associations (religious, fraternal/sororal, 
business, and political organizations) that could have played an important role in 
galvanizing support for the provision of local publicly provided goods …. These 
associations … provide another indicator of community cohesion. 
Like them, we measure social capital by the fraction of the provincial 
population living in small and isolated communities. Allcott et al. (2007) 
provide a theoretic foundation to such an indicator: their argument is that in 
small communities, the number of potential relations is limited; thus the 
probability that the network neighbourhoods of two friends overlap is higher 
even when the total number of friends is fixed. This means social networks 
in small communities are more interconnected and therefore the density of 
social interactions is higher. 
Goldin and Katz’s measure can be replicated for our data, but it is not 
sufficient to identify isolated communities: in 1915 Iowa, the overall 
population density was very low; therefore, living in a small town meant 
living far from other towns. Present-day Italy, on the contrary, is 
characterised by a high population density. This means that living in a small 
town is not necessarily the same as living in an isolated place. An example is 
the Po valley in northern Italy: towns can be really small (below 500 
inhabitants) but they are often next to others, with no free land in between. 
This means that the percentage of the population living in small towns does 
not necessarily identify isolated communities. Therefore, the closure of 
social networks characterising an Italian province is identified by the 
percentage of the population living in towns with fewer than 500 citizens 
(C500) only after controlling for three other variables. The first two are the 
fraction of a province’s hilly territory (hill) and the fraction of mountainous  
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FIGURE 1 
Geographical distribution of social capital proxies 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Geo-Starter database, 1998–2000. 
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territory (mountain), which should control for the ‘Po valley’ effect. The 
third variable is the fraction of territory devoted to agriculture (agricultural), 
and it is meant to control for a different source of cohesiveness, pointed out 
by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993): a province where people are 
mainly involved in agriculture could be assumed to be a closed community 
(in the Coleman sense), either for cultural reasons or for common working 
interests.8 These variables are informative, i.e. they do not simply follow a 
north–south gradient (see Figure 1 and Table B3 in Appendix B). 
The network definition we use for social capital is a local interaction 
concept: the social network is based on direct links among individuals and 
therefore on geographic proximity. In such a way, we are implicitly ruling 
out the possibility that long-distance relationships may affect our results. 
Unfortunately, our data set does not include clear migration measures, such 
as province-to-province migration flows, to account for such an effect 
directly. Nevertheless, internal mobility in Italy over a time span as short as 
the one we are using is a limited phenomenon.9  
Moral hazard may well depend also on global interaction effects. To be 
specific, it may depend on a feeling of trust towards others not necessarily 
induced by direct linking, but based on mutual experience, prejudice, culture 
and so on. Local and global interaction effects are likely to be correlated; 
thus if the latter have a role in explaining moral hazard, a measure of them 
must be included among the regressors in order to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of the social capital effect. We follow Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004) and use an index derived from a question from the World Values 
Survey in Italy in 1999. The question was 
Using the responses on this card, could you tell me how much you trust other Italians 
in general? (5) Trust them completely. (4) Trust them a little. (3) Neither trust nor 
distrust them. (2) Do not trust them very much. (1) Do not trust them at all.  
The results of the World Values Survey are available at regional level 
(NUTS2). This could generate a potential collinearity problem with the 
macro-area dummies. Nevertheless, trust index values do not follow exactly 
a north–south gradient (see Figure 2 and Table B3 in Appendix B).  
 
8We also experimented with a more parsimonious version of the empirical specification in which 
agricultural does not appear, without significant differences in the parameter’s estimate accounting for 
social capital. 
9From the data provided by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), we gather that 73 per cent of 
respondents were still resident in the province where they were born. 
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FIGURE 2 
Geographical distribution of trust 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 1999. 
 
V. Model estimation and results 
Our data set is a balanced panel; we have 103 observations from 1998 to 
2000. A pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) is likely to be inefficient, since 
the IID (independent and identically distributed) hypothesis on the error 
terms is usually inappropriate in panel data settings. Once the longitudinal 
dimension of the data set is taken into account, such a hypothesis can be 
tested. If the poolability test rejects, the choice remains open between a fixed 
effects (FE) and a random effects (RE) specification. In our case, we are 
forced to choose RE: FE estimators are based on within-group heterogeneity, 
i.e. they require all the explanatory variables to vary within each group (in 
our case, within each province). Two of our key explanatory variables are 
based on the shape of provinces’ territory, which is clearly invariant. Even 
excluding these regressors, many other variables have a low variability 
within each province, thus reducing the efficiency of an FE estimator. 
1. The panel model 
The econometric model to be estimated in its most general form is the 
following:  
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(1) 1 103 0 2it it i ity i … t …ν ε= + + = , , ; = , ,X β  
where νi and εit are independent of each other and both uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, X. yit is the log of non-life insurance premiums per 
capita in province i and year 1998+t.  
Defining ξit = νi+εit, the assumption that shocks are independent can be 
rewritten as  
 2 2Var( )it ν εξ σ σ= + ;
 
2Cov( )it is t sνξ ξ σ, = ∀ ≠ ; 
Cov( ) 0it js t s i jξ ξ, = ∀ ≠ , ≠ . 
A test for the RE model against a pooled OLS is a test for  
 
2
0
2
1
0
0
H
H
ν
ν
σ
σ
: =
: > . 
Assuming normality of the errors, a parsimonious testing strategy can be 
based on the Lagrange multiplier (LM) principle: the OLS model is 
estimated and then maintained, while it is compared with the more general 
alternative in a maximum likelihood framework. Test statistics are based on 
the OLS residuals without need to estimate the panel model. Baltagi (1995) 
reports the original LM test derived by Breusch and Pagan (1980) together 
with some refinements. We run the King and Wu (1997) modification, which 
is distributed as a standard normal.10 The result of the test is 0.8762, with p-
value equal to 0.1905, thus not providing any evidence in favour of the RE 
model.  
Relaxing the assumption of ‘well-behaved’ residuals (see equations (2) 
and (3) below), another test for unobserved individual effects feasible in 
short panels is given in Wooldridge (2002). The test statistic is 5.3016, with 
p-value smaller than 10–6, this time favouring the RE specification. Given 
the test results and since RE estimators remain consistent under the OLS 
specification, we proceed estimating an RE model.  
2. The random effects model 
Under the RE specification with homoscedasticity in both νi and εit and no 
serial correlation in εit, the variance–covariance matrix of the errors becomes  
 
10This is a locally mean most powerful refinement of the usual Breusch–Pagan χ2 test. Breusch and 
Pagan test 20 0H νσ: =  against 21 0H νσ: ≠ , thus rejecting for 2 0νσ < , which should be excluded by the 
model restrictions. The original Breusch–Pagan test strongly rejects the null. 
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 2 2( ) ( )TN T N TV I I Iν εσ σ= ⊗ + ⊗′i i  
where IN is the N×N identity matrix and iN is an N×1 vector of 1s. Therefore, 
V is block-diagonal with  
(2) NV I= ⊗Ω  
where  
(3) 
2 2 22
22 2 2
2 2
22 2 2
…
…
…
ε ν νν
νν ε ν
ν ν
νν ε ν
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+
+Ω =
+
M
O
. 
Observations regarding the same province share the same νi effect; thus 
the relative errors are autocorrelated, with 
2
2 2( )
Corr( )is it νε ν
σ
σ σν ν += . Ordinary 
least squares estimates for β in model (1) are therefore inefficient, though 
consistent. Generalised least squares (GLS) are the efficient solution if Ω is 
known. Various feasible GLS procedures exist drawing on consistent 
estimators of Ω. The standard approach to RE panels is to assume both (2) 
and (3). In ‘large N’ panels, a less restrictive approach is possible, termed the 
general GLS estimator (GGLS) by Wooldridge (2002), which allows for 
arbitrary intra-group heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors, i.e. 
inside the Ω covariance blocks, provided that these remain the same for 
every individual. GGLS estimates are reported in column 1 of Table B4 in 
Appendix B.  
3. Spatial structure 
As observed when describing the insurance data in Section III, there are 
good reasons to think that non-life insurance activity may not follow 
provincial administrative boundaries. For example, provinces may not 
overlap with operational areas of the sales force. As in many other studies 
about the spatial distribution of an economic phenomenon, this problem 
cannot be neglected. In particular, Millo and Lenzi (2005) found evidence of 
spatial correlation for several specifications of regressions of insurance on a 
set of demographics, based on the very same data set.11  
 
11However, Millo and Lenzi carried out a cross-sectional spatial analysis of the determinants of 
insurance in Italy. As such, it suffered from unobservable heterogeneity issues which in later work, this 
paper included, were tackled through panel data techniques. 
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In econometric applications, geographic distance is characterised by 
means of a proximity matrix, W, containing a distance measure for every 
pair of data points.12 Hence Wy, the spatial lag of y, stands for ‘the value of y 
at neighbouring locations’.13 Anselin (1988) warns about the relevant 
consequences on estimation and inference of the choice of W. Here we 
resorted to a proximity matrix where each entry wij is the inverse of the 
coordinates’ distance between provinces i and j, with a cut-off point at  
250 kilometres (i.e. any wij < 1/250 is set equal to 0). W is row-standardised, 
so that Wy is simply the weighted average of values of y at neighbouring 
locations.  
The two standard specifications for spatial effects in regression models 
are the spatial lag (SAR) model:  
 y Wyρ ε= + +Xβ  
and the spatial error (SEM) model:  
 
y e
e Weλ ε
= +
= +
Xβ
. 
Panel extensions have been considered by Anselin (1988) and Elhorst 
(2003), who provided efficient estimation procedures for both the SAR and 
SEM random effects models. Case (1991) considered an encompassing 
model, incorporating a SAR term, spatial autoregressive errors and random 
effects:14  
(4) it it it it
it it i it
y Wy e
e We
ρ
λ ν ε
= + +
= + +
X β
. 
Elaborating on the procedures given in Elhorst (2003) for the SAR and 
SEM models, we estimate specification (4) by maximum likelihood. Results 
are reported in column 2 of Table B4.  
Social capital effects are not completely absorbed by equilibrium prices: 
supply-side proxies (in particular, the log of insurance agencies per capita, 
ag/pop) do have a positive effect but two out of four social capital proxies 
have positive and significant coefficient estimates. The coefficient on trust is 
positive and significant, confirming the role of global interactions. 
Regarding spatial structure, as we expected, non-life insurance demand  
 
 
12By convention, elements on the diagonal are set to 0. 
13See Anselin (1988, chapter 3) for a classic treatment. 
14As Case observed, one can subsequently test for SAR versus SEM alternatives by means of Wald 
tests on this nesting model. 
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TABLE 1 
Spatial autoregressive and spatial error model (SAREM) specification, 
marginal effects 
Marginal effect 
C500  2.790** 
(1.217) 
mountain  –0.107 
(0.106) 
hill  –0.072 
(0.076)  
agricultural  –0.210 
(0.133) 
Notes: Marginal effects are computed over the mean of the relevant variables. The relevant coefficient 
estimates are given in column 2 of Table B4 in Appendix B. Standard errors are given in parentheses.  
** significant at 5 per cent. 
 
exhibits spatial correlation: ρ is positive and significant. The significance of 
the interaction parameters suggests a non-linear dependence on our social 
capital proxies. We therefore compute marginal effects for the social capital 
variables, shown in Table 1.  
The marginal effect of C500, which was the only variable interacted with 
all the other social capital variables, is positive and significant, while all 
others are not. All the social capital variables are measured in percentage 
points; the magnitude of such an effect is not negligible: a 10 per cent 
increase in social capital measured as the percentage of the population living 
in small towns (C500) leads to a 27.9 per cent increase in insurance demand. 
Given these results, we next investigate the relation between social capital 
and spatial correlation in the dependent variable.  
As for non-life insurance demand, social capital may not follow 
administrative boundaries and may exhibit a spatial structure. First evidence 
in this direction is obtained by plotting Moran’s I statistics in Figure 3.  
Moran’s I statistic is a spatial correlation measure. If the proximity matrix 
is a row-standardised dichotomous matrix, Moran’s I statistic boils down to 
the regression coefficient of the variable of interest over its spatial lag.15 The 
Moran plot is the relative scatter plot where the variable of interest is plotted 
on the x-axis and its spatial lag is plotted on the y-axis. The solid straight 
lines on Figure 3 are the OLS estimated ones. The graphs show that both 
insurance demand (top-left panel) and the social capital variables exhibit 
spatial correlation. Moran’s I statistics give the same indication if a distance-
based W is used. Our expectation is that, since the empirical implication of 
our model is a causal relation between social capital and insurance demand, 
such a causality should be reflected in the spatial structure as well. In order  
 
 
15See Anselin (1988). 
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FIGURE 3 
Moran plots 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid straight lines are the OLS estimated ones. The dashed lines mark the average value on 
each axis. 
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to test it, we repeated the panel SAREM estimation for a model that does not 
include social capital variables (column 3 of Table B4) and compared the 
magnitude of the spatial autoregressive coefficient, ρ, and the spatial error 
coefficient, λ. The results are in line with the causal relation implied by the 
model: a panel model without social interactions effects exhibits a 
significant spatial autocorrelation structure (ρ ≠ 0) and augmenting the 
model with social capital variables significantly reduces the spatial 
autogressive coefficient. We interpret this finding as meaning that social 
capital has a positive marginal effect on non-life insurance demand, and its 
spatial structure accounts for a significant fraction of insurance demand’s 
spatial structure.  
Anselin (1988) points out the possible bias introduced by a wrong choice 
of the proximity matrix W. We performed a robustness check employing a 
binary contiguity matrix16 and two different distance-based matrices, the first 
based on the inverse of road-travelling distance and the second on the 
inverse of the Euclidean distance between the geographic coordinates of 
capital cities in each province. Estimating the model with the contiguity 
matrix, the picture is virtually unchanged, except for the greater significance 
of the spatial error term, which may be reflecting aggregation bias, cross-
border spillovers and effects related to direct neighbourhood in general. The 
results of the two alternative distance-based specifications are very similar as 
well, both given the same cut-off point and with different cut-off points.17  
VI. Conclusions 
Our starting point is Arnott and Stiglitz (1991)’s model on the coexistence of 
marketed and non-marketed insurance contracts. If there is peer 
observability or supervision so that the non-marketed contract can be 
enforced, their main conclusion is that informal agreements are not 
disruptive for the formal insurance market. We suggest that this is not the 
only way to reduce moral hazard in informal agreements: trust, social 
stigma, the power of reputation and social pressure – in a word, social capital 
– can induce cooperative behaviour even with asymmetric information. The 
two main issues the economic literature has to tackle when dealing with 
social capital are to provide a sound economic definition of this sociological 
concept and to find a credible empirical measure for it. We describe non-
market agreements theoretically as strategic decisions of agents playing a 
cooperative game with neighbours. Each individual adopts a trigger strategy 
to punish neighbours deviating from the cooperative equilibrium in any 
 
16A binary contiguity matrix is a 0/1 matrix where wij = 1 if i and j share a common boundary and wij = 
0 otherwise. 
17Results of these alternative specifications are not reported here but all are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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game they are involved in. Such behaviour leads to a pairwise-stable 
equilibrium, which is more likely the higher the level of social capital 
embedded in the social network. The network approach we choose provides 
us with a formal definition of social capital, which allows us to extend the 
Arnott–Stiglitz model and to obtain a clear testable implication. The 
empirical part of the paper uses a province-level Italian data set. We 
carefully choose a set of proxies for social capital and estimate a spatial 
autoregressive random effects panel model. Our results confirm that social 
capital has a positive marginal effect on the demand for market non-life 
insurance.  
Appendix A. Formal derivation of the theoretic model 
The starting point is the canonical moral hazard model without non-market 
insurance. There is a single and fixed-damage accident. The probability of its 
occurrence, p(e), is strictly convex and decreasing in the individual’s effort 
at accident avoidance, e, which is not observable to the insurer. Individual 
wealth is w and the damage caused by the accident is d. Individuals pay a 
premium β and receive a net payout α if the accident occurs. Expected utility 
has the following form:  
 
( )
( ) 0 1
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) .
MEU p e U w p e U w d e
p e u p e u e
β α= − − + − + −
= − + −  
EU M is well behaved (increasing and strictly concave) and separable, 
meaning that in both states of the world it is strongly separable in w and 
effort; disutility of effort is event independent, the effort is measured by the 
disutility it causes and utility of consumption u(·) is event independent. At 
the competitive, constrained equilibrium, the insurer offers less than full 
insurance to induce its clients to augment their effort at accident avoidance, 
i.e. d – α > β. This equilibrium is stable only if clients purchase no additional 
insurance.  
Non-market insurance is introduced as follows: a couple of symmetric 
individuals, i and j, agree that if only one of them has an accident, the other 
will transfer δ to the former. Each of them realises that the extra insurance 
will pay out if they have an accident and their partner does not; therefore 
their expected utility changes:  
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(A1) 
( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
0 1
2 3
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) .
i i j i j
i j
i j i
i j i j
i jj i i
EU p e p e U w p e p e U w d
p e p e U w
p e p e U w d e
p e p e u p e p e u
p e p e u p e p e u e
β α
β δ
α δ
= − − − + − +
+ − − −
+ − − + + −
= − − +
+ − + − −
 
Individuals maximise their utility considering α and β and therefore the 
contract’s price q = q(α, β) as given: they perceive that by entering a mutual 
contract, they can buy extra insurance at the market price q. They choose δ, 
which is the premium but also the pay-off of the non-market agreement.  
If moral hazard affects the non-market agreement – i.e. if each individual 
does not observe the other’s effort and there are no incentives to cooperate – 
the exclusivity provision cannot be enforced: each client pays an extra 
premium δ if the partner has an accident and she does not, while she receives 
an extra pay-off δ in the opposite case. It is optimal for them to reduce their 
effort, while the insurance company is still offering the same contract. This 
is a partial equilibrium result since it does not consider the reaction of 
insurance companies to agents’ behaviour. In a general equilibrium context, 
the company knows that the required level of effort for the offered contract 
cannot be enforced: non-market insurance crowds out market insurance and 
individuals substitute insurance provided by a risk-neutral insurer with that 
provided by a risk-averse one. Expected utility, EU = EU MH, is then lower 
than without non-market insurance.  
Moral hazard does not play a role if the insured perfectly observe each 
other’s efforts or if there are incentives to cooperate. Individuals choose δ 
and ei given q(α, β). Again, each of them assumes peers entering non-market 
agreements to be rational; therefore the optimal level of effort will be the 
same for everybody; thus ei = ej ⇒  p(ei) = p(ej) and (A1) simplifies to  
 2 20 1 2 3(1 ) (1 )( )
NMHEU EU p u p u p p u u e= = − + + − + − . 
The utility-maximising non-market agreement is δ* = (d – α – β)/2, which 
brings coverage up to full insurance.  
In the presence of moral hazard, this risk reduction induces individuals to 
reduce effort, thus displacing the insurance company, which is no longer 
able to enforce a positive level of effort. The effort-reducing effect of the 
extra coverage is present even without moral hazard, but in this case a 
positive provision of informal insurance δ implies a positive level of effort e 
by each agent entering the non-market agreement. Furthermore, it is 
relatively easy to prove that the effort is not only positive but also increasing 
 Does social capital reduce moral hazard? 361 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 The Authors 
Fiscal Studies © 2010 Institute for Fiscal Studies 
in δ between 0 and the optimal level δ* as long as p(e) < ½.18 This is due to 
the fact that as δ increases, individuals become less selfish in their choice of 
effort. Thus, non-market agreements in this case have two opposite effects 
on e. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) prove the following proposition:  
Proposition 1. If non-market agreements are available (i.e. 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ*) and 
they do not involve moral hazard and if p < ½, then holding the contract 
offered by the insurance company ( )q q α β= , %%%  constant, non-market 
agreements are welfare enhancing, i.e. EU NMH > EU M.  
Thus the direct utility-increasing effect of informal agreements dominates 
the effort-reducing effect of extra coverage. Again, Proposition 1 is a partial 
equilibrium result. Allowing the insurer to adjust the price q, it maximises its 
expected utility with respect to β and α under the zero-profit condition 
1 p
pα β−=  and assuming that individuals maximise their own utility (i.e. e = 
e* and δ = δ* = (d – α – β)/2).19 
We can now characterise the demand function of marketed insurance 
contracts. We assume that insurance companies can offer only linear 
contracts, i.e. q(α, β) = β/α. Second, market insurance contracts are exclusive, 
meaning that agents can sign just one contract with one insurance firm to 
cover a given risk. Third, the insurance market is competitive and companies 
set the price in order to make zero profit, i.e. at equilibrium q = β/α = 
p(e)/{1–p(e)}. 
Insurers discriminate on the basis of all observable characteristics of 
agents and thus, conditional on a set of demographics X, potential clients 
differ only by their effort. Thus we assume without loss of generality that all 
individuals are identical.20 
Drawing from the analytical treatment of moral hazard models in Arnott 
and Stiglitz (1988), we can now restrict the utility functions of individuals in 
order to have a characterisation of demand functions:  
Proposition 2. Assume the expected utility function falls in the class
( )1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )EU p e U w p e U w d e= − + − − , i.e. it is separable, disutility of 
effort is event independent, e is measured by the disutility it causes and 
utility of consumption U(·) is event independent. Assume also that 
 
18Such a condition is reasonable: individuals want to insure against events with high losses d but small 
probability p. See Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) for details on the proof. 
19The model can easily be extended to a heterogeneous agents setting. Insurers offer different contracts 
based on a vector Xj of observable variables such as age, gender, marital status and loss ratios (the ratio 
between claims paid and premium received) in a particular region. What they are not able to do, due to 
information asymmetry, is to offer different contracts based on individual effort. 
20This is just in order to simplify notation. Alternatively, given a population in which individuals differ 
along X and their effort, the results in the remainder of this appendix can be thought of as conditional on 
X. 
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3
20
( )lim
e
p e
p e e↓
∂ /∂ > −∞∂ /∂ ∂ . Then demand for insurance decreases with the price of 
insurance and effort increases with price.  
Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), differentiating the first-order conditions of the 
individual’s effort-choice problem, show that for a generic separable utility 
function, insurance purchases decrease and effort increases with price but for 
discontinuity points in the price–consumption line, which is the locus of 
utility-maximising linear contracts. Moreover, the authors show that a 
sufficient condition for this line to be everywhere continuous is convexity of 
indifference curves. The last assumption of the proposition fulfils this 
requirement: the limit condition implies that p is not too responsive to the 
effort e (i.e. p′ is low) and that the curvature is high enough (i.e. p′′ is high) 
at any point (α, β). An example of such a p(e) function is ( )p e p eγ= − , 
where γ > ½: if individuals put no effort into accident avoidance, i.e. 
( )p e p= , then the probability of suffering a wealth loss d is decreasing with 
a power function of the effort.  
Proposition 2 states that insurance demand and effort e depend on 
insurance price q. Effort e and price q are chosen simultaneously: if only 
market contracts are available, agents choose e e= %  to maximise their 
expected utility, considering q%  as given. On the other hand, firms internalise 
agents’ best responses while pricing the contract; thus q q= %  is the best 
response to e% . If agents can enter non-market agreements that do not involve 
moral hazard, equilibrium effort and price change.  
Proposition 3. Assume insurance companies offer only linear contracts,  
i.e. q(α, β) = β/α, market insurance contracts are exclusive, the  
insurance market is competitive and companies set q in order to make  
zero profit. Assume also that the utility function falls in the class 
( )1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )EU p e U w p e U w d e= − + − −  and that p(e) is such that p(e) < ½ 
and 
3
20
( )lim
e
p e
p e e↓
∂ /∂ > −∞∂ /∂ ∂ . Then if there exists an equilibrium without non-
market agreements 0 { 0}E e q δ: , , =%% %  and one with non-market agreements 
and no moral hazard 1 { 0}E e q δ∗ ∗ ∗: , , > , demand for market insurance is 
higher in E1 than in E0.  
Proof 
Without moral hazard, it is optimal for clients to enter a mutual agreement δ 
such that the total coverage α + δ reaches full coverage, f .  
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Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) prove that e is increasing in δ; thus q q= %  and 
0 e eδ > ⇒ > % .  
The insurers acknowledge the presence of informal agreements and 
internalise it: given that for any level of q the effort is higher than with δ = 0 
and since the insurance market is competitive, there will always be a firm 
willing to undercut q until the new equilibrium price q* satisfies the zero-
profit condition q* = p(e*)/{1–p(e*)}. Therefore, q q∗ < % .  
At q*, the client can reach f  by buying extra coverage on the market 
α α∗ > %  and setting fδ α∗ ∗= − .  
Proposition 2 states that demand is decreasing in price. Thus, since 
q q∗ < % , demand is higher in E1 than in E0. QED  
Note that the way we modelled informal agreements implies a hidden 
assumption: once i and j enter the non-market insurance contract, they can 
choose their level of effort but they must respect the contract. In other words, 
we assume that i will transfer δ* to j every time j has an accident and i does 
not. Given the informal nature of the agreement, this assumption may not be 
without loss of generality. In order to relax it, we could have considered the 
transfer δ as uncertain and rewritten the model in terms of its expectation 
E[δ].  
Suppose now that pairs of individuals entering a non-market insurance 
agreement with a given δi,j can choose in each period whether to put in effort 
eMH, the one with moral hazard in the Arnott–Stiglitz framework, or e*, effort 
without moral hazard. If expected utility is decreasing in effort, this is a 
simple discrete coordination game. From (A1),  
 
( ) ( )
( )
0 1 2 3
3 0 1 2
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1,
i
j j j j i
i
j j i
EU p e u p e u p e u p e u p e
e
u u p e u u p e p e
∂ ⎡ ⎤ ′= − − + − + − −⎣ ⎦∂
⎡ ⎤ ′= − − + − −⎣ ⎦
 
which is decreasing in ei if β*+ δi,j < d – α*– δi,j, i.e. the total cost of insurance 
β*+ δi,j must be lower than the loss suffered when the accident occurs,  
d – α* – δi,j.21 If this condition holds (together with p(e) < ½), the game 
rewritten in strategic form with expected utilities as pay-offs is of the 
prisoner’s dilemma type (see Figure A1). Since marginal utility is decreasing 
in (own) effort, for individual i we can write  
 
21In order to prove Proposition 3, we used the fact that at E1, i.e. the equilibrium with non-market 
agreements, each client reaches full coverage, i.e. β*+ δ* < d – α*– δ*. This does not contradict the 
assumption that β*+ δi,j < d – α*– δi,j: as will be clear in the remainder of this appendix, each individual 
can play the same game with all her neighbours; therefore δ* = Σδi,j and the two conditions can hold 
simultaneously. 
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FIGURE A1 
The non-market insurance game in strategic form 
  Player j 
  e* eMH 
Player i 
e* ,ij jiEU EU
∗ ∗  ,L Hij jiEU EU  
eMH ,
H L
ij jiEU EU  ,
MH MH
ij jiEU EU  
 
 
 
( )
( )
H
ij i MH j ij
L MH
ij i j MH ij
EU EU e e e e EU
EU EU e e e e EU
∗ ∗
∗
= = , = >
= = , = < . 
Once this game is put in a dynamic setting, the social network can be 
described as in Vega-Redondo (2006): we have a finite population of agents 
N = {1,2,…,n) where each pair of interacting agents (i, j) is involved in an 
infinite repetition of the described game. Players’ decisions to connect are 
captured by a directed graph g N N⊂ ×r , where each directed link ( )i j g, ∈ r  
is player i’s decision to connect with player j. Suppose now that every 
linking decision leads to play. We have a definition for social network:  
Definition 1 (social network). The social network induced by the linking 
decision gr  is the undirected graph g N N⊂ ×  defined as  
 ( ) [( ) ( ) ]i j N i j g i j g j i g∀ , ∈ , , ∈ ⇔ , ∈ ∨ , ∈r r  
and for any player i the set of her neighbours is { ( ) }iN j N i j g= ∈ : , ∈ . 
In order to complete the repeated game model, we need a rule for 
information diffusion within the network: in our model, that is information 
spread around the network gradually. To be specific, at each round before 
playing, i and j share information about their behaviour with their 
neighbours, i.e. whether they deviated from the cooperative strategy. To 
sustain a cooperative equilibrium, it is also necessary for each agent to adopt 
a strategy to punish defiance: i forces herself to play a trigger strategy, i.e. 
she will switch to defect from j if she discovers j deviated with some of her 
neighbours. More formally, for any agent i, the strategy sg is of the following 
type:  
1. Player i chooses whether to start her interaction with j putting in effort e* 
(which is to cooperate) or to put in effort eMH.  
2. In following rounds, she reacts immediately to the news that j did not 
start with e* with some jk N∈  by switching irreversibly to eMH in her 
game with j.  
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In order to define equilibrium, some additional notation is needed: πi(sg) 
is the overall pay-off from the link (i, j) given the strategy sg; for every agent 
i, gCs  and 
g
Ds  are the strategies that start respectively with cooperation and 
defection with all the agents ik N∈ .  
Definition 2 (pairwise-stable network, PSN). A PSN is a network where 
for every separate link, both players have incentives to sustain the 
cooperative equilibrium, i.e. for all ( ) ,i j g, ∈  ( ) ( )g gi C i Ds sπ π≥ . 
The connection of this definition with the social capital literature is clear 
once the PSN is characterised in terms of cohesiveness.  
Definition 3 (i-excluding distance). The i-excluding distance between j and 
k, d i(j, k), is the shortest path joining j and k that does not involve player i. In 
other words, it is the number of steps needed for any information held by j to 
reach k (and vice versa) without the concourse of i.  
Given Definitions 2 and 3, it is possible to state the following 
proposition:  
Proposition 4. Let g be a social network where agents play the described 
game, and they all face a common discount factor (0 1)η∈ , . Define 
L
ik ik ikEU EUν ∗= − . Then g is a PSN if and only if for all ( )i j g, ∈ ,  
 ( )
{ }
(1 ) (1 )
i
i
d j k H
ij ik ik ij
k N j
EU EU EUη η η ν η∗ , ∗⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∈ /+ + − ≥ −∑ . 
Proof 
Proof of Proposition 4 follows the one in Vega-Redondo (2006). 
The normalised pay-off function if i cooperates with j is  
 
0
( ) (1 )
i i
g
i C ij ij
k N k N
s EU EUτ
τ
π η η∞⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪∗ ∗⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪∈ = ∈⎩ ⎭= − =∑ ∑ ∑ , 
while if i deviates her anticipated pay-off is  
( ) 1
( )
{ } 0
( ) 1
( ) ( )
0{ }
( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(
i
i
i
i
i i
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d j k
g H s d j k L
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d j k
s d j k d j kH
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π η η η η η
η η η η η η η ν
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, −
∗ , ∗ ,
=∈ /
= − + − + −
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Therefore, the stability condition ( ) ( )g gi C i Ds sπ π≥  can be rewritten as  
 ( ) 1 ( )
{ }
(1 ) 1 (1 )
i i
i i
H d j k d j k
ij ij ik ik
k N k N j
EU EU EUη η η η ν⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞∗ , + ∗ ,⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭∈ ∈ /≥ − + − − −∑ ∑  
( ) 1 ( )
{ } { }
1 1 (1 )
i i
i i
d j k H d j k
ij ik ij ik
k N j k N j
EU EU EUη η η ν
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞∗ , + ∗ ,⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠∈ / ∈ /⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ − + ≥ − −∑ ∑  
 ( ) 1 ( )
{ }
(1 ) (1 )
i i
i
d j k d j k H
ij ik i j ik ij
k N j
EU EU EUη η η ν η⎧ ⎫∗ , + ∗ ,⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬,⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∈ /+ + − ≥ −∑  
 ( )
{ }
(1 ) (1 )
i
i
d j k H
ij ik ik ij
k N j
EU EU EUη η η ν η∗ , ∗⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∈ /+ + − ≥ −∑ , 
which is in the form of Proposition 4. QED  
The implications of this proposition are:  
• stability is more likely in large-span networks, i.e. in networks where 
each agent i has a large neighbourhood Ni;  
• stability is more likely in cohesive networks, i.e. in networks with small 
excluding distances d i(j, k).  
Given this formalisation, 
Definition 4 (social capital). The stock of social capital of network g is the 
density of g.22  
The network model presented in this appendix restricts the efforts’ space 
of agents entering a non-market agreement to a high and a low effort level. 
We chose this approach in order to simplify the exposition, but this is not a 
crucial assumption: what really matters for community enforcement of 
cooperative behaviour is information transmission among community 
members. Buonanno, Pasini and Vanin (2008) obtained a similar result 
through a model of repeated interaction on a continuous social network, 
adapted from the work by Dixit (2003) on the extent of honest trade. The 
conclusion of the theoretic model is that in a pairwise-stable network, agents 
have no incentives to reduce their effort, i.e. moral hazard is inversely 
related to network stability. Therefore, the empirical implications of the 
model are that demand for market insurance is increasing in network 
cohesiveness and, from Definition 4, in the stock of social capital.  
 
22The density of a network is the average number of links per agent (degree) in the network. 
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Appendix B. Supplementary tables 
TABLE B1 
Variable descriptions 
Variable Description  
agricultural  Percentage of the land devoted to agriculture  
ag/pop  Log of agencies per capita  
C500  Percentage of population living in towns with fewer than 500 inhabitants  
den/1000  Population density, inhabitants per square kilometre (scaled by a factor  
of 1,000)  
dep/pop  Log of bank deposits per capita  
export/va  Share of exports in total value added  
hill  Percentage of hilly territory  
inef  Indicator of juridical system inefficiency: average duration of civil trials  
lrpro  Loss ratio of the property sector for previous year  
mountain  Percentage of mountainous territory  
nfam  Average number of family members  
pop25.54/pop60  Ratio of people aged 25–54 to people aged over 60  
trust  Trust indicator as defined by the World Values Survey (see Section IV)  
u.rate  Unemployment rate  
va.ind/va  Share of industry in total value added  
va.serv/va  Share of services in total value added  
va/1000  Total value added (scaled by a factor of 1,000)  
Yd/pop  Log of disposable income per capita  
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TABLE B2 
Summary statistics 
 Min.  1st qu.  Median  Mean 3rd qu.  Max. 
Yd/pop  9.00 9.27 9.54 9.47 9.63 9.84 
pop25.54/pop60  0.74 0.90 1.02 1.04 1.16 1.58 
inef  1.44 2.74 3.47 3.79 4.59 8.32 
den/1000  0.04 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.26 2.66 
va.ind/va  0.11 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.46 
va.serv/va  0.52 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.85 
u.rate  1.71 5.01 7.55 10.90 16.14 33.16 
export/va  0.01 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.63 
nfam  2.05 2.46 2.61 2.62 2.78 3.15 
lrpro  0.25 0.43 0.49 0.52 0.59 1.82 
trust  3.03 3.17 3.25 3.26 3.35 3.62 
C500  0 0 0.11 0.79 0.76 6.31 
mountain  0 0 30.68 31.92 52.43 100 
hill  0 17.25 42.40 41.95 63.14 100 
agricultural  6.84 38.01 58.61 54.85 73.28 91.97 
dep/pop  1.35 1.78 2.20 2.11 2.38 3.09 
va/1000  1.27 4.21 6.22 10.04 10.18 112.10 
ag/pop  –8.98 –8.01 –7.73 –7.83 –7.62 –7.32 
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TABLE B3 
Geographical distribution 
Area  Min.  1st qu. Median  Mean  3rd qu. Max. 
C500  North-West  0 0.49 1.24 2.14 3.90 6.31 
North-East  0 0 0 0.32 0.31 3.38 
Centre  0 0 0.10 0.29 0.14 3.88 
South  0 0 0.10 0.51 0.23 3.93 
Islands  0 0 0 0.41 0.11 3.99 
      
mountain  North-West  0 9.08 44.96 43.18 64.31 100 
North-East  0 0 24.54 29.17 40.20 100 
Centre  0 7.08 31.68 31.02 42.48 85.32 
South  0 3.99 29.73 32.12 54.20 100 
Islands  0 0 11.10 16.86 30.68 66.30 
      
hill  North-West  0 6.50 18.70 25.24 38.25 97.29 
North-East  0 0 20.38 23.12 35.91 100 
Centre  0 47.31 65.50 60.58 74.14 100 
South  0 32.10 52.95 47.59 60.98 80.91 
Islands  33.70 53.52 65.20 64.61 73.88 86.97 
      
agricultural  North-West  6.84 19.11 37.66 42.54 68.84 91.01 
North-East  11.73 45.16 66.26 57.35 72.44 88.43 
Centre  17.17 41.33 51.66 50.35 61.47 76.03 
South  22.02 56.42 66.38 63.72 75.19 91.97 
Islands  31.58 55.12 70.80 64.92 78.05 84.43 
      
trust  North-West  3.17 3.31 3.31 3.32 3.37 3.37 
North-East  3.13 3.22 3.35 3.30 3.39 3.40 
Centre  3.07 3.11 3.19 3.24 3.35 3.35 
South  3.03 3.09 3.24 3.20 3.25 3.63 
Islands  3.17 3.17 3.17 3.19 3.24 3.24 
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TABLE B4 
Estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Yd/pop 1.200*** 
(0.162) 
1.238*** 
(0.173) 
1.301*** 
(0.178) 
dep/pop 0.200*** 
(0.051) 
0.089* 
(0.048) 
0.071 
(0.049) 
pop25.54/pop60 0.329** 
(0.118) 
0.250** 
(0.124) 
0.182 
(0.123) 
va/1000 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
va.ind/va 0.404 
(0.439) 
0.451 
(0.449) 
0.559 
(0.448) 
va.serv/va 0.376 
(0.430) 
0.364 
(0.449) 
0.366 
(0.438) 
export/va 0.0084 
(0.091) 
0.052 
(0.083) 
0.091 
(0.084) 
u.rate –0.00034 
(0.002) 
–0.001 
(0.002) 
0.00003 
(0.002) 
nfam 0.0083 
(0.108) 
0.017 
(0.109) 
0.043 
(0.108) 
inef –0.047*** 
(0.011) 
–0.041*** 
(0.013) 
–0.030** 
(0.017) 
den/1000 0.082** 
(0.049) 
0.107* 
(0.056) 
0.087 
(0.056) 
ag/pop 0.174*** 
(0.054) 
0.117** 
(0.051) 
0.120** 
(0.051) 
lrpro 0.018 
(0.022) 
0.016 
(0.021) 
0.015 
(0.021) 
trust 0.414*** 
(0.118) 
0.394*** 
(0.134) 
0.250* 
(0.137) 
C500 41.565*** 
(10.884) 
36.771*** 
(12.049) 
 
mountain 0.142*** 
(0.091) 
0.181* 
(0.104) 
 
hill –0.0037 
(0.071) 
0.033 
(0.082) 
 
agricultural 0.0013 
(0.112) 
0.033 
(0.125) 
 
C500×mountain –40.717*** 
(9.822) 
–36.313*** 
(10.877) 
 
C500×hill –12.563*** 
(4.209) 
–13.302*** 
(4.790) 
 
C500×agricultural –36.972*** 
(12.226) 
–30.652** 
(13.510) 
 
ρ  0.148*** 
(0.023) 
0.208*** 
(0.025) 
λ  –0.526 
(0.345) 
–0.494 
(0.331) 
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Notes to Table B4 
Column 1 reports the generalised GLS estimation for a random effects panel data model and no correction 
for spatial correlation. Column 2 reports estimates assuming random effects and accounting for spatial lag 
(SAR) and spatial autoregressive errors. The proximity matrix W is based on the coordinates’ distance 
between provinces, with a cut-off at 250 kilometres. ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and λ the 
spatial error coefficient. Column 3 estimates are obtained with the same procedure as column 2, not 
accounting for social capital. Standard errors are given in parentheses. * significant at 10 per cent;  
** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. 
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